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ABSTRACT
Near space operations represent some of the most challenging
yet promising future uses of the aerospace. Attracted by their
envisioned high profitability, governmental and non-governmental
entities have shown a growing interest in placing high-altitude
vehicles in the near space to provide various types of services, such
as telecommunication and internet access.
Despite these
possibilities, near space plans are impeded by the uncertain legal
status of the near space, which pose regulatory challenges to the
development of near space services.
In order to promote the beginning of a near space era, this
Article suggests a new categorization of the near space as the
Exclusive Utilization Space (EUS). Drawing inspiration from the
precedent of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Article
proposes a series of basic principles intended to facilitate the
management of the near space and to clarify the rights and duties
of the entities involved in its utilization.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Near space operations represent the future of activities in the
airspace. Indeed, thanks to technological leaps, the capability to
carry out operations at altitudes between 18 and 100 kilometers
(from 59,005 to 328,083 feet), the so-called “near space,” to provide
communication, navigation, sensing, internet, and other services, is
rapidly becoming a reality.1 The significance of this fact should not
be underestimated because, until now, activities have taken place
either at lower altitudes (the core of civil aviation operations takes
place below 38,000 feet above sea level) or in outer space (namely,
beyond the altitude of 100 kilometers).
Already two decades ago, various attempts to perform longduration high-altitude activities were undertaken in the United
States.2 These efforts were, however, mostly unsuccessful3 and did
not lead to marketable products.4 Recently, the near space has
once again attracted the attention of investors and several projects,
1
For a review of these technologies, see generally ALEJANDRO ARAGÓNZAVALA, JOSÉ LUIS CUEVAS-RUÍZ & JOSÉ ANTONIO DELGADO-PENÍN, HIGH-ALTITUDE
PLATFORMS FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS (2008), which provides an overview on
high-altitude platforms; Flavio Araripe d’Oliveira, Francisco Cristovão Lourenço
de Melo & Tessaleno Campos Devezas, High-Altitude Platforms—Present Situation
and Technology Trends, 8 J. AEROSP. TECHNOL. MANAG. 249 (2016), which surverys
the history of high-altitude platforms and the current trends and challenges;
Stylianos Karapantazis & Fotini-Niovi Pavlidou, Broadband Communications Via
High-Altitude Platforms: A Survey, 7 IEEE COMM. SURVS. & TUTORIALS 2 (2005),
which examines communication aspects of High-Altitude Platforms; Toshiaki
Tsujii, Masatoshi Harigae & Masashi Harada, Navigation and Positioning System
Using High Altitude Platforms Systems (HAPS), 52 J. JAPAN SOC’Y AERONAUTICAL
SPACE SCI. 175 (2004); and Emanuela Falletti, Massimaliano Laddomada, Marina
Mondin & Fabrizio Sellone, Integrated Services from High-Altitude Platforms: A
Flexible Communication System, IEEE COMM. MAG., Feb. 2006, which analyzes a
flexible communication system for high-altitude-platform-based communication,
in particular the delivery of broadband services to high-speed trains.
2 See Araripe d’Oliveira et al., supra note 1, at 251–56 (describing various
research and development projects over the past 20 years).
3 See ARAGÓN-ZAVALA ET AL., supra note 1, at 20–25 (reviewing examples of
unsuccessful projects such as SkyStation and Halo, the former aimed at placing
solar-powered high-altitude platforms at altitudes around 21 kilometers to
provide wireless communication services, the latter planned to deploy airplanes at
similar altitudes to offer broadband communication).
4 See id. at 23; Dean N. Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72 J.
AIR L. & COM. 65, 94–100 (2007).
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including the development of various kinds of high-altitude
platforms, have been launched. Interestingly enough, the media
has covered these initiates with significant interest.5 For example,
in 2013 the U.S. company Google X (now simply “X”) announced
Project Loon, aimed at creating an aerial wireless network through
the placement of balloons at altitudes between 18 to 25 kilometers.6
Similarly, in 2014, Facebook unveiled the Facebook Internet project
which intended to develop a high-altitude network of solarpowered, unmanned aircraft to furnish Internet capability to
underserved areas.7
Asian-based entities are also actively engaged in near space
initiatives. For instance, the Chinese company Kuang-Chi is
developing helium-filled balloons and other kinds of lighter-thanair vehicles to furnish aerial surveillance, communication, near
space tourism, and wireless Wi-Fi transmission to remote areas.8
5 See, e.g., Will Oremus, Not as Loony as it Sounds, SLATE (Dec. 2, 2014, 1:21
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/12/project_loon_
how_google_s_internet_balloons_are_actually_working.html
[https://perma.cc/W442-H6TH]; Tom Simonite, Billions of People Could Get Online
for the First Time Thanks to Helium Balloons That Google Will Soon Send Over Many
Places Cell Towers Don’t Reach, MIT TECH. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2015,
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/534986/project-loon/
[https://perma.cc/N4B5-QBGH].
6 See
LOON, https://loon.co/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2019) (providing an
overview of the company’s activities) [https://perma.cc/YX4S-TUK3]; David
Lumb, Project Loon Delivers Internet to 100,000 People in Puerto Rico, ENGADGET
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/11/09/project-loon-deliversinternet-100-000-people-puerto-rico/ [https://perma.cc/MEF5-JMCK] (noting
that in October 2017 the X company was able to provide immediate Long Term
Evolution (LTE) coverage to Puerto Rico in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria).
Furthermore, X concluded an agreement in 2016 with Sri Lanka to provide full
internet coverage using LTE. See Google’s Internet Ballons Project Hits
Turbulence
in
Sri
Lanka,
NATIONAL
(Feb.
16,
2017),
https://www.thenational.ae/business/google-s-internet-ballons-project-hitsturbulence-in-sri-lanka-1.638993 [https://perma.cc/2977-6CXQ].
7 See Jessi Hempel, Inside Facebook’s Ambitious Plan to Connect the Whole World,
WIRED (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/facebook-zuckerberginternet-org/ [https://perma.cc/L7UV-M95U].
8
For further
information about Kuang-Chi,
see KUANG-CHI,
http://www.kuang-chi.com/en/ [https://perma.cc/3X3D-9HKC] (last visited
Jan, 25, 2019), which details the activities of Kuang-Chi; Press Release, KuangChi, Traveler Will Be Launched in the Southern Hemisphere (Mar. 23, 2015),
http://www.kuang-chi.com/en/index.php?ac=article&at=read&did=1003
[https://perma.cc/R43M-ECTB], which reveals that on November 21, 2014,
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Three factors are contributing to the growing attention toward
the near space. First, its use is expected to be profitable. Analysis
reveals that the high-altitude platform market should grow at an
annual rate of 8.7 percent and reach a value of $4.77 billion by
2023.9 Secondly, the near space offers several opportunities for
start-up companies and newcomers.10 Conversely, traditional
areas of operation, such as the airspace and outer space, lack
similar conditions, with both environments experiencing growing
levels of congestion11 and competition.12 Thirdly, high-altitude
platforms are cheaper to launch and operate than satellites.13
Kuang-Chi signed a joint memorandum with Airways New Zealand to enable the
launch of a near space commercial platform called Traveler from New Zealand
territory; and Press Release, Kuang-Chi, Traveler Launched in New Zealand (June
8,
2015),
http://www.kuangchi.com/en/index.php?ac=article&at=read&did=1004 [https://perma.cc/7FKUBW4K], which announces that the Traveler was successfully launched on June 6,
2015. See also Wen-Qin Wang & Dingde Jiang, Integrated Wireless Sensor Systems
via Near Space and Satellite Platforms: A Review, 14 IEEE SENSORS J. 3903–3914
(providing technical information about the use of wireless sensor systems in the
near space).
9 See High Altitude Platforms (Airships, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and
Tethered Aerostat Systems), Market-Global Industry Analysis, Size, Share, Growth,
Trends and Forecast 2015–2023, TRANSPARENCY MKT. RES. (Mar. 2016),
https://www.transparencymarketresearch.com/high-altitude-platformstechnologies.html.
10 See Ned Allen, Our Strategic Space Shore: Opportunities in Near Space, 31
AEROSPACE AM. 45 (2007) (suggesting that the near space presents a strategic
opportunity for the United States because it is an “aggressive environment” and it
little used by others).
11
Paul Stephen Dempsey & Kevin O’Connor, Air Traffic Congestion and
Infrastructure Development in the Pacific Asia Region, in ASIA PACIFIC AIR TRANSPORT:
CHALLENGES AND POLICY REFORMS CONFERENCE 23–25 (Christopher Findlay, Chia
Lin Sien & Karmjit Singh eds., 1997) (discussing current levels of congestion in
Pacific Asia); PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 164–71
(2008); Justin T. Barkowski, Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the Next
Generation Air Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Trajectories, and—
Privatization?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 247 (2010) (asking how we can efficiently manage
the need for open skies).
12 See NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2010),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_polic
y_6-28-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BGP-R5ZW] (discussing the increasing
importance of and activity in outer space).
13 See Araripe d’Oliveira et al., supra note 1, at 260; PAUL DEMPSEY & MARIA
MANOLI, SUBORBITAL FLIGHTS AND THE DELIMITATION OF AIR SPACE VIS-A’-VIS OUTER
SPACE: FUNCTIONALISM, SPATIALISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, at 43–44, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.9,
U.N.
Sales
No.
V.18-01929(E)
(2018),
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Despite these positive elements, near space commercial
operations are still hampered by technical and legal obstacles. On
one side, it is still technically challenging to sustain long-term
activities in the near space. Particularly problematic are aspects
related to energy storage, the strength of lightweight structures,
and the overall reliability of vehicles.14 On the other side, the legal
status of the near space remains uncertain. Due to the fact that no
international law specifically regulates it, the legal nature of the
near space as well as the rules applicable therein remain doubtful.15
Importantly, while efforts to solve the technical difficulties
impeding operation in the near space are being undertaken,16 no
comprehensive action to clarify its legal regime is being carried
out. This Article argues that this state of being is no longer
sustainable. Indeed, the present uncertainty harms business plans
and innovation because it renders the permissibility of an activity,
the modalities of its implementation, and its possible revenues,
questionable.
The current legal environment is particularly
detrimental to near space projects of an international nature,17
http://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2018/aac_105c_22018cr
p/aac_105c_22018crp_9_0_html/AC105_C2_2018_CRP09E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96BK-URFV] (discussing the use of high-altitude platforms);
see also Leonard David, Sky Treck to the ‘Near Space’ Neighborood, SPACE (Nov. 9,
2005),
https://www.space.com/1761-sky-trek-space-neighborhood.html
[https://perma.cc/BE8N-CP7N]; How Close are High-Altitude Platforms to
Competing
with
Satellites,
SPACENEWS
(Oct.
26,
2017)
https://spacenews.com/how-close-are-high-altitude-platforms-to-competingwith-satellites/ [https://perma.cc/DYE6-2Q5J]; Near Space: The Shore of Our New
Ocean,
HOBBYSPACE,
http://www.hobbyspace.com/NearSpace/
[https://perma.cc/Z2LU-558L] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
14
For more information on these technical challenges, see Araripe d’Oliveira
et al., supra note 1, at 258–60, which details the technological challenges of
lightweight structures, thermal management, operation at low altitude, and
reliability.
15 See infra Section 2.3.
16 See Araripe d’Oliveira et al., supra note 1, at 260 (citing the investment in
high- altitude platform projects and the evolution of new technology); DAVID
GRACE & MIHAEL MOHORČIČ, BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS VIA HIGH-ALTITUDE
PLATFORMS 5 (2011) (“[g]iven the state of maturity of the different HAP vehicles, a
step-by-step development approach is now being pursued by organizations, with
the aim of generating confidence, develop the technology, and perhaps more
importantly provide revenue streams for manufacturers.”).
17
For examples of these international projects, see Karapantazis & Pavlidou,
supra note 1, at 5; and Nicholas J. Colella & James N. Martin, High Speed Internet
Access
via
Stratospheric
HALO
Aircraft,
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namely those involving the deployment of a system of vehicles,
platforms, transmitters, and various links in the near space above
foreign territories to offer wireless communication and other
services.18 These ventures are envisioned to generate high profits.19
Nevertheless, it is precisely in that context that the unclear legal
relationship between the states above which the high-altitude
vehicles are placed and the operators of those vehicles—together
with issues related to sovereignty and security—compromises
these ventures.
Thus, it is evident that the implementation of near space plans
faces numerous obstacles. In an attempt to ameliorate this
situation, this Article suggests a new legal classification of the near
https://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/4d/4d_3.htm
[https://perma.cc/6D25-Q7T6] (last visited Jan, 25, 2019), which describes the
Angel Technologies Corporation’s project that intends to provide high-speed
internet access via stratospheric HALO aircraft deployed at 51,000 feet. Another
kind of project is proposed by companies like Airborne Wireless Network (AWN)
that plan to operate a high-speed broadband airborne wireless network by linking
commercial aircraft in flight. Essentially, AWN wants to place its broadband
transceivers on a critical mass of airborne aircraft and use equipped aircraft as
signal repeaters capable of providing wireless signals all over the world. See
Woodrow Bellamy III, This Company Plans to Turn Airplanes into Communications
Satellites,
VIA
SATELLITE
(Feb.
8,
2017),
https://www.satellitetoday.com//telecom/2017/02/08/company-plans-turnairplanes-communications-satellites/
[https://perma.cc/3XFD-QQAA]
(describing AWN and its plan called the “Infinitus Super Highway”); AIRBORNE
WIRELESS
NETWORK,
http://www.airbornewirelessnetwork.com/index.asp
[https://perma.cc/L8HQ-X7TS] (last visited Jan, 25, 2019) (explaining more about
the company).
18
For examples of these projects, see Eric C. Cook, Broad Area Wireless
Networking via High Altitude Platforms (2013) (unpublished master’s thesis,
Naval
Postgraduate
School),
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/34648/13Jun_Cook_Eric.pdf?s
equence=1 [https://perma.cc/3MEQ-TV8D], which discusses developing
technologies aiming to provide broad-area wireless networking to support
military operations; and Zhe Yang & Abbas Mohammed, High Altitude Platforms
for Wireless Mobile Communication Applications, in MOBILE AND WIRELESS
COMMUNICATIONS: PHYSICAL LAYER DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 47–56
(Salma Ait Fares & Fumiyuki Adachi eds., 2010), which details various
international high-altitude platform projects.
19
Indeed, several states, although not possessing near space technology nor
intending to develop it, are still interested in benefiting from near space services
and allowing their population to access it. See Araripe d’Oliveira et al., supra note
1, at 252–58 (describing various international projects and partnerships); ARAGÓNZAVALA ET AL., supra note 1, at 23–25 (discussing European high-altitude platform
projects).
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space as the “Exclusive Utilization Space” (EUS). Accordingly, the
legal status of the near space should be distinguished from that of
national airspace and outer space. Essentially, under the EUS
proposal, the space located approximately between the altitude of
18 to 100 kilometers (between 59,005 to 328,083 feet), now labeled
the Exclusive Utilization Space (EUS), should lay outside of
national sovereignty and be governed by basic rules intended to
maximize its profitable use and orderly management. This
approach would: a) stimulate technological development and
investments in the near space sector; b) eliminate unnecessary
obstacles to the international utilization of the near space; c) put in
place a level playing field for operators; d) allow a substantial
number of countries and users to benefit from it; e) clarify the legal
status of the near space; and f) establish the rights and duties of the
states and entities that use it.
The EUS proposal is not intended to undermine the sovereign
rights and the security interests of the state above which territory
an Exclusive Utilization Space would be located, a state which we
can call the “underlying State.” On the contrary, while the EUS
would not be part of its territory, such a State would maintain
several sovereign prerogatives over it, including the right to: a)
choose if and how to establish the EUS; b) use the EUS on a priority
basis; c) negotiate the conditions to be complied with by foreign
entities; and d) enforce safety and security matters in relation to the
operations of domestic and foreign entities. Overall, the EUS idea
aims at balancing the sovereign interests of the underlying State
with the creation of economic opportunities for domestic and
foreign operators.
The EUS proposal draws inspiration from the concept of the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as provided in the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention. Notwithstanding the differences between the
two, there are several characteristics of the EEZ that, if adequately
modified, can be used as a model to shape the legal regime of EUS.
The Article will first describe the legal status of the near space
and the core elements of the Exclusive Utilization Zone; then, it
will elaborate upon the constitutive elements of the Exclusive
Utilization proposal.
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2. THE NEAR SPACE: A DESCRIPTION
2.1. The issue of delimitation
The near space is located between the airspace and outer
space.20 Indeed, due to its physical characteristics, it naturally
divides these two zones because neither traditional civil aviation
activities nor space operations can be carried out therein.21 On one
hand, commercial passenger aircrafts can safely fly up to the
altitude of 12 kilometers (38,000 feet);22 beyond that point the air
20 See generally Ruth Stilwell, The First 100KM, the Case for Integrated Space
and Aviation Policy and Governance, in SPACE SAFETY IS NO ACCIDENT 561–70
(Tommaso Sgobba & Isabelle Rongier eds., 2015) (positing that in addressing
policy questions about access and priority of airspace, the international
community should try to balance the competing demands of civil aviation and
commercial space operators); Joseph N. Pelton, A New Integrated Global
Regulatory Regime for Air and Space: The Needs for Safety Standards for the Protozone
(Second Manfred Lachs International Conference on Global Space Governance,
Montreal, May 2014); Matthew T. King, Sovereignty’s Grey Area: The Delimitation of
Air and Space in the Context of Aerospace Vehicles and the Use of Force, 81 J. AIR L. &
COM. 377 (2016) (noting that the line between the “disparate legal regimes” of
airspace and outer space will be tested by the development of aerospace
vehicles that can operate in and transition between the two).
21 See, e.g., FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 163
(2009) (noting the history of the policy arguments for dividing the spaces);
Jinyuan Su, Near Space as a Sui Generis Zone: A Tri-Layer Approach of Delimitation,
29 SPACE POL’Y 90 (2013) (“The lack of a legal boundary between air space and
outer space has not given rise to significant difficulties in the determination of
applicable law with respect to traditional flight craft – aircraft and space objects –
due to their separated sphere of activities.”); Joseph N. Pelton, Urgent Security
Concerns in the Protozone, Presentation at the Fourth Manfred Lachs
International Conference on Global Space Governance (May 2016),
https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/files/iasl/mlc4_presentation_j_pelton.pptx
[https://perma.cc/BHE5-VDE8] (noting the need for space legal experts to
formally consider the area above commercial airspace and below the area that can
allow satellites to stay in orbit); King, supra note 20, at 403 (explaining that the
current spacial definition is guided by physical, scientific, or natural attributes,
not law or policy).
22
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not allow commercial
aircraft to exceed the altitude of 40,000 feet (MSL) unless the structure is certified
to not have any type of decompression. See generally U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
FAA AC NO. 61-107B, AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AT ALTITUDES ABOVE 25,000 FEET MEAN
SEA LEVEL OR MACH NUMBERS GREATER THAN .75 (Mar. 29, 2013),
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/do
cument.information/documentID/1020859 [https://perma.cc/96CC-YF94].
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becomes increasingly less dense until the moment where either the
wings cannot generate sufficient lift, or the engines cannot produce
enough thrust.23 Additionally, air navigation services cannot be
effectively carried out beyond the altitude of around 18 to 20
kilometers above sea level (between 59,005 to 328,083 feet), the socalled Flight Level (FL) 600.
The existing air navigation
technologies have not yet been adapted to function in the near
space.24 On the other hand, the altitude of 100 kilometers (328,083
feet) represents the unofficial starting point of outer space because
at around that altitude the atmosphere becomes too thin to support
aeronautical flight and a vehicle needs to travel faster than orbital
velocity to derive sufficient aerodynamic lift to sustain itself.25
Significantly, some states have indicated 100 kilometers (328,083
feet) as the point separating the national airspace from outer space.
For instance, Australia,26 Kazakhstan,27 and Denmark28 have
23 See King, supra note 20, at 407, 411 (discussing the fundamental aspects,
physical and legal, of the space and air domains); Rebecca Maksel, Who Holds the
Altitude Record for an Airplane?, AIR & SPACE MAG. (May 28, 2009),
https://www.airspacemag.com/need-to-know/who-holds-the-altitude-recordfor-an-airplane-141522931/ [https://perma.cc/N2QM-7ZHM].
24
For the purpose of air traffic control, domestic airspace is divided into
different categories, such as controlled, uncontrolled, special use, and other
airspace. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA-H-8083-25B, PILOT’S HANDBOOK OF
AERONAUTICAL
KNOWLEDGE
15-1
–
15-12
(2016),
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak
/media/17_phak_ch15.pdf [https://perma.cc/82WV-FXHC] (describing the
categories and subcategories of airspace); Airspace, THE LOGBOOK (Aug. 1, 2012,
4:59
PM),
http://herschlogbook.blogspot.com/2012/08/airspace.html
[https://perma.cc/8MXB-VB7X] (diagramming the classifications). Generally,
domestic regulations apply to a maximum altitude of Flight Level (FL) 600,
approximately 60,000 feet (18,000 meters). See, e.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
NY/NJ/PHL AIRSPACE REDESIGN FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT app. A
(July 2007),
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/nas/nynjphl_redesign/documentation/feis/m
edia/Appendix_A-National_Airspace_System_Overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82WV-FXHC] (identifying airspace classifications and
terminology).
25
In practice, Low Earth Orbit satellites (Low Earth Orbit consists of the
orbits located between 150 to 2000 kilometers or 6,561,679 feet of altitude) are
normally placed at a minimum level of 160 kilometers (524,934 feet) because
below that altitude satellites enter a state of orbital decay caused by the
atmospheric drag. Low Earth Orbit is an orbit around the Earth with an altitude
of 2000 km (524,934 feet). See CLAUDE NICOLLIER & ROGER-MAURICE BONNET,
OUTER SPACE ENVIRONMENT, OPPORTUNITIES, STAKES AND DANGERS 4 (2015).
26 See Space Activities Act 1998, (Cth) pt 2 (Austl.) (defining “space object” as
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enacted national space legislation applicable to activities occurring
at an altitude of 100 kilometers or higher.
Overall, even though international law does not set the precise
spatial delimitation of the near space, there is a general
understanding of where its boundaries lie.
2.2. Legal regime of the near space
Legal scholars disagree as to the legal status of the near space.
Such a controversy derives from the lack of international treaties
regulating it. Thus, one can safely say that the near space
represents a grey area in international law.
From a legal perspective, the key issue is whether the near
space should be considered as part of the airspace or outer space,
or if it should be deemed to have a separate legal status. In the
absence of a guidance provided by international legal instruments
specifically governing it, the most viable approach seems to be the
analysis of air and space law conventions. While these conventions
do not specifically regulate the near space, they may provide useful
elements to ascertain the legal regime applicable therein.
The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation
(commonly referred to as the Chicago Convention)29 is the
fundamental instrument of the public international air law system.
The Convention, which is widely ratified, establishes the pivotal
rules regulating international transportation by air.30
“a payload (if any) that the launch vehicle is to carry into or back from an area
beyond the distance of 100 km above mean sea level.”).
27 See LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN ON SPACE ACTIVITIES ch. 1, art. 1
(2012) (defining “cosmic space” as “the space, extending beyond the air space at a
height of more than one hundred kilometers above sea level.”).
28 See DANISH OUTER SPACE ACT pt. II (2016) (defining “outer space” as “Space
above the altitude of 100km above sea level.”).
29
Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 43, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
30 See DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 11, at 41–65
(overviewing the 1944 Chicago Convention); Michael Milde, The Chicago
Convention – After Forty Years, 9 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 119 (1984) (calling the
Chicago Convention the “cornerstone of legal regulation of international civil
aviation for the past forty years”); Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Convention on
International Civil Aviation (2014) (analyzing the provisions of the treaty).
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Article 1 of the Chicago Convention recognizes states’ complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above their territory.31
It clarifies that a state’s sovereignty extends beyond its land and
territorial sea to also include the airspace above its territory.32
Based on this premise, such a state is entitled to apply its laws and
exercise its jurisdictional powers over the airspace above its
territory.33
The provisions of Article 1 were driven by security concerns34
and were meant to protect the national soil from dangerous
Accordingly, the Chicago
activities and foreign attacks.35
Convention prohibits aircrafts from entering a foreign national

31
This principle was first established in Article 1 of 1919 Paris International
Convention on Air Navigation that recognized that “every Power has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” Convention on
the Regulation of Aerial Navigation art. 1, Oct. 13, 1919, 297 LNTS 173. For an
overview of the period between the 1919 Paris Convention to the 1944 Chicago
Convention, see Malgorzata Polkowska, The Development of Air Law: From the Paris
Conference of 1910 to the Chicago Convention of 1944, 33 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 59
(2008); and P. Dupont, L’Espace Aérien entre Souveraineté 220 R.F.D.A.S. 13 (2004).
32
For an analysis of Article 1 of the Chicago Convention and the concept of
sovereignty applied to national airspace, see King, supra note 20, at 407; DEMPSEY,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 11, at 44; Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 69–
76; John Cobb Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxi “Cuius est Solum” in International
Air Law, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 54–102 (Ivan A.
Vlasic ed., 1968); F. Lyall, The Maxim “Cuius est Solum” in Scots Law, 147 JUR. REV.
69 (1978); and Herbert David Klein, Cuius est Solum, Eius Est . . . Quousque
Tandem?, 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 237 (1959).
33 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (1994) (“The United States Government has
exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.”); 19 C.F.R. 122.49b(a)
(defining the term “Territorial Airspace of the United States” as the airspace over
the United States, its territories, and possessions, and the airspace over the
territorial waters between the United States coast and 12 nautical miles from the
coast”).
34 See John C. Cooper, United States Participation in the Drafting of the Paris
Convention, 18 J. AIR L. & COM. 266, 267 (1951) (“A very considerable part of the
work of this Commission was devoted to military problems, particularly the effort
to prevent or limit German air rearmament after the conclusion of peace.”); D.
Goedhuis, Civil Aviation After the War, 36 AM. J. INT’L LAW 596 (1942) (asking
whether World War I brought about a change in states’ relaxed policy toward
aviation regulations); D. Goedhuis, Sovereignty and Freedom in the Airspace, 41
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 137 (1955) (noting historical defenses of the idea of
freedom of air).
35 See Abeyratne, supra note 30, at 14 (explaining the good governance
required for the proper running of a state).
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airspace without prior authorization by special agreement.36 Aside
from enjoying several rights, states’ parties have the obligation to
ensure the safety of aircrafts transiting through their national
airspace37 and to manage air traffic pursuant to the ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs).38
Significantly for our discussion, the Chicago Convention does
not establish a vertical limit to state sovereignty. Consequently,
what is the upward limit of a state’s territory (or quasi-territory),
and whether the near space is included in it, remains unanswered.
In this regard, two views have been put forward. The first claims
that a state’s sovereignty extends vertically with no limits until the
point where outer space begins. This view originates from the old
Latin maxim “cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum,” which
means: “Whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky,” or in more simple
terms: “He who possesses the land possesses also that which is
above it.” Under this construct, the near space would be part of a
state’s national airspace and subject to its laws and control. In
1906, Prof. Westlake advocated, “[i]f there exists a limit as to the
sovereignty of the State over the oceanic space, none exists for the

36 See Chicago Convention, supra note 29, arts. 3, 6. For further restricting
measures on access and use of the airspace in the U.S., see FAA, AIRSPACE
RESTRICTIONS,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly/airspace_restrictions/
[https://perma.cc/RYC5-E9PH].
37 See DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 11, at 164–203;
Roxanne Zolin & Ira Lewis, Air Navigation Services and the United States: A
Comparative Case Study, in MACROTHINK INSTITUTE CASE STUDIES IN BUSINESS AND
MANAGEMENT 96 (2014) (comparing air navigation services in Australia and the
United States); Performance of Air Navigation Services (International Civil Aviation
rganization
Working
Paper
ATConf/6-WP/52,
Mar.
18,
2013),
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6wp0522_en.pdf?TSPD_101_R0=37676aabab1d818626cd0a0284b62248sf3000000000000000
073edcf3cffff00000000000000000000000000005936250a0039bd337d
[https://perma.cc/K55M-2MFE] (discussing developments in European air
navigation services).
38
The term “SARPs” is used by ICAO to refer to the technical specifications
adopted by its Council to achieve to achieve “the highest practicable degree of
uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to
aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such
uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation.” Chicago Convention, supra
note 29, art. 37; see also DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 11, at
61–65.
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sovereignty of the State over the air space.”39 The second view
proposes a more technical approach based on the ability of a state
to effectively provide air navigation services. Accordingly, the
national airspace should extend vertically as high as a state can
enforce its sovereignty.40 For example, Prof. Cooper claimed, “[The
Chicago Convention] deals with no areas of space other than those
parts of the atmosphere where the gaseous air is sufficiently dense
to support balloons and airplanes.”41 Therefore, under this
approach, the near space would not be part of the national
airspace, as states cannot sufficiently perform air navigation
services therein.
Evidently, international air law does not clarify the legal status
of the near space. The picture is not clearer when analysis switches
to international space law. First, the space treaties regulate
activities occurring in space properly considered. Therefore, their
scope goes beyond the area usually referred to as “near space.”42
Second, international space law fails to even set the physical lower
border of outer space. Hence, it leaves uncertain the question on
how to delimitate outer space from the airspace. Notably, since the
early days of space activities, states have not managed to agree on
a criterion to separate airspace and outer space.43 The sections
above the 100 km mark have been referred to as the lower border
of outer space. However, such a view is not universally accepted.
39
John C. Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, in
EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS BY JOHN COBB COOPER 1946–
1966 256, 258 (Ivan A. Vlasic ed., 1968) (quoting Westlake).
40 See H.B. Jacobini, Effective Control as Related to the Extension of Sovereignty in
Space, 7 J. PUB. L. 97, 115 (1958) (“[i]n regard to the extension of national
sovereignty over territorial space, the upper limits of this jurisdiction will be
determined by the extent upward to which the subjacent state can exert effective
control . . . .”).
41
John C. Cooper, Legal Problems of Upper Space, 50 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
85, 88 (1956).
42
International space law regulates the activities of objects launched into
outer space, either in Earth orbit or beyond.
43
On the issue of delimitation between airspace and outer space, see LYALL
& LARSEN, supra note 21, at 153; Thomas Cheney & Lauren Napier, Policy Analysis:
Air versus Space, Where Do Suborbital Flights Fit into International Regulations?, 7 J.
SCI. POL’Y & GOV. 1 (2015) (discussing the regulation of suborbital flight); D.B.
Craig, National Sovereignty at High Altitudes, 24 J. AIR L. & COM. 384 (1957)
(examining national sovereignty in light of technological developments in space
exploration); and Cooper, supra note 41.
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Overall, it is clear that neither international air law nor space
law clarify the legal nature of the near space. Under these
circumstances, it is reasonable to look elsewhere to find useful
elements to address the matter. In this regard the analysis of
national initiatives, particularly the adoption of national laws
governing activities in the near space, might be useful. Indeed, the
existence of similar laws could give room to argue that the near
space is part of the national airspace. Regrettably, the study of
similar laws does not provide a satisfactory picture. Only one
state, New Zealand, has passed legislation specifically regulating
near space activities. Other states have only addressed operations
occurring below the 20 km altitude mark and have not answered
the question of the upward delimitation of their national airspace.
The New Zealand Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities
Act was enacted on December, 21, 201744 with the purposes of: a)
regulating space activities as well as high-altitude activities; b)
facilitating the development of a space industry.45 The drafting of
the Act was motivated by the advantages of using portions of the
largely uninhabited New Zealand territory to test and launch
rockets and high-altitude vehicles.
Regrettably, the Act falls short of providing a clear regulation
of high-altitude activities. It defines “high altitude” as being above
flight level 600 (FL 600) (which is normally located at around 18 km
(59,005 feet))46 and being above the highest upper limit of
controlled airspace (which is usually established at 2.9 km (around
9,500 feet)).47 However, as the Act does not set the upper limit of

44
Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017 (N.Z.),
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0029/45.0/DLM6966275.html
[https://perma.cc/X8X9-JCHE] (laying out license requirements for launches and
high-altitude activities).
45
For an analysis of the drafting of the Act, see Gareth Hughes, Outer Space
and High-Altitude Activities Bill—Third Reading, GREEN (July 6, 2017, 11:38 AM),
https://www.greens.org.nz/news/speech/gareth-hughes-outer-space-and-highaltitude-activities-bill-third-reading [https://perma.cc/6K9P-GGGF].
46
Stephen K. Hunter, Safe Operations Above FL600 (Space Traffic
Management Conference, 2015),
https://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=stm
[https://perma.cc/C3WS-8GGR].
47 See Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017, pt 1, s 4
(“Interpretation”); see also Hunter, supra note 46.
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the high-altitude areas, the extent to which its high-altitude
provisions apply remains doubtful. ,
The Act states that a person: “must not launch a high-altitude
vehicle from New Zealand . . . unless the person has a highaltitude license for the launch.”48 A launch license is also required
to launch objects into outer space.49 However, in the absence of a
precise delimitation between where outer space begins and the
high-altitude area ends, doubts remain as to which of the two
licenses should be at stake in any given case. Importantly, a highaltitude license is linked to the use of a “high-altitude vehicle,”
which is defined as “an aircraft or any other vehicle that travels, is
intended to travel, or is capable of travelling to high altitude.”50
This definition still does not clarify when an altitude would be
high enough to constitute outer space.
Apart from New Zealand, no other states have specifically
regulated near space activities. Instead, their attention has been
focused on the implementation of air navigation services above
their territory. These services are provided only up to the so-called
Flight Level 600 (FL 600). As a large majority of states have not
enacted rules applicable beyond FL 600, one can argue that the
altitude around 18 km constitutes the upper limit of national
airspace. Under this construct, anything located above that point,
including the near space, would consequently lay outside of state
sovereignty. However, there are also states that, while not having
legislated beyond FL 600, have kept this possibility open. For
example, in the United States, the Federal Aviation
Administration’s authority formally extends up to FL 600.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that it ends at FL 600. Federal
Aviation Regulations Section 71.71, Class E airspace, describes
what FAA authority exists above FL 600 by defining Class E
airspace as: “The airspace of the United States, including that
airspace overlying the waters within 12 nautical miles of the coast
of the 48 contiguous states and Alaska, extending upward from
14,500 feet MSL up to, but not including 18,000 feet MSL, and the
48
Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017, pt 2, s 45
(“Requirement for high-altitude license”).
49
Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017, pt 2, s 7 (“Launch of
launch vehicle from New Zealand requires launch license”).
50
Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017, pt 1, s 4.
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airspace above FL600 . . . .”51 Furthermore, 49 U.S. Code § 40103,
provides that: “The Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall develop plans and policy for the use of the
navigable airspace and assign by regulation or order the use of the
airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient
use of airspace.”52
Thus, the FAA has the authority to regulate air traffic from over
the United States from just above the surface to a point where the
atmosphere becomes too thin to support aeronautical flight.53 In
short, the United States considers its national airspace to extend
beyond FL 600, even though U.S. legislation does not set a precise
vertical limit to it.
The uncertain legal nature of the near space is further
reinforced by the nature of near space vehicles that cannot be
assimilated to either aircraft or spacecraft. While these vehicles are
capable of certain flying maneuvers, their maneuverability and
performance cannot be assimilated to that of an aircraft.54 Further,
a space object is specifically designed to be launched and operated
in outer space, two characteristics that near space vehicles do not
possess. Indeed, they are usually meant to remain stationary at
altitudes much lower than outer space.55
In sum, the legal status of the near space is highly
controversial. One can claim that the near space belongs to a
14 C.F.R. § 71.71 (2018).
49 U.S.C. § 40103 (1994).
53 See generally DEMPSEY & MANOLI, supra note 13, at 17 (noting a distance
between 80 and 90 km above the surface of the Earth as “the point after which the
aircraft functions cannot be maintained, for the density of the atmosphere is not
sufficient . . . .”).
54
Near space vehicles can be divided into free floaters and maneuvering
vehicles. Free floaters’ flying speed and direction depend mostly on existing
winds, even though they are also capable of limited steering that enables them to
float at different altitudes and take advantage of different wind directions and
speed. In contrast, maneuvering vehicles can use a variety of propulsion
mechanisms to fly or keep stationary over a specific area of interest. For example,
high-altitude buoyant lift systems rise only to an altitude where the ambient air
density equals the weight-to-volume ratio of the buoyant system. See Su, supra
note 21, at 91.
55 See INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, RADIO REGULATIONS art. 1.66A (2016) (defining
a High Altitude Platform Station (HAPS) as “[a] station located on an object at an
altitude of 20 to 50 km and at a specified, nominal, fixed point relative to the
Earth.”).
51
52
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state’s national airspace. In this respect, there is nothing in
international law that prevents states from enacting legislation
applicable to the near space above their territory. However, it is
also arguable that the near space lies outside of the national
airspace. This idea is rooted in the technical challenges and the
physical characteristics of the near space that complicate a state’s
ability to enforce its jurisdictional power above a certain altitude.
Starting from these considerations, there seems to be sufficient
elements to suggest the conferral of a new legal status to the near
space and to establish basic rules to govern activities therein.
3. THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
3.1. Historical evolution
The formulation of the Exclusive Utilization Space (EUS)
proposal has been influenced by the precedent of the legal regime
applicable to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).56 Although
there are evident differences between the near space and the EEZ,
several EEZ rules, with proper modification, provide a useful
precedent to regulate activities in the near space.
Part V of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOS) defines the
EEZ as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject
56
The literature on the EEZ is extensive. See, e.g., R. CHURCHILL & V. LOVE,
THE LAW OF THE SEA 133–152 (1999); DAVID J. ATTARD, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC
ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987); BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILES
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA (1989); Gemma Andreone,
The Exclusive Economic Zone, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
159–180 (Donald Rothwell, Alex Odue Elferink, Karen Scott & Tim Stephens eds.,
2015) (examining the evolution of the EEZ, its juridical nature, and which legal
regimes are applicable); BUDISLAV VUKAS, The Los Convention and Sea Boundary
Delimitation, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: SELECTED WRITINGS 83–111 (2004) (discussing
the delimitation of maritime zones and the LOS Convention); DONALD R.
ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 82–97 (2010)
(discussing the EEZ, its relation to other maritime zones, and the rights and duties
of coastal and other states); Francis Rigaldies, La Zone Économique Exclusive dans la
Pratique des États’, 35 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 3 (1997) (discussing types of economic
zones and the degree to which states adhere to their jurisdiction); A SEA CHANGE:
THE EXCLUSIVE ZONE AND GOVERNANCE INSTITUTION FOR LIVING MARINE RESOURCES
(Syma A. Ebbin, Alf Håkon Hoel & Are K. Sydnes eds., 2005) (discussing the EEZ
and living marine resources).
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to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the
rights and jurisdiction57 of the coastal State and the rights and
freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of
the Convention”.58 A coastal state enjoys sovereign rights to
manage and exploit the living and non-living resources located
within its EEZ. These rights are, however, not exclusive in the
sense that other states also benefit from certain limited rights and
freedoms.59
From a legal perspective, the EEZ is often viewed as a sui
generis zone60 because it combines elements of the regimes relevant
to territorial waters and the high seas.
Historically, the concept of the EEZ derived from the initiatives
of coastal states to expand their sovereign and jurisdictional rights
beyond the 12 nautical miles borderline of territorial waters.61 A
milestone in this process were the 1945 President Truman’s
57
Robin R. Churchill, The Impact of State Practice on the Jurisdictional
Framework Contained in the LOS Convention, in STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE LAW
OF THE SEA: THE ROLE OF THE LOS CONVENTION 91, 126 (2005).
58
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 55, Dec. 10, 1982,
1834 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
59 See Francisco Orrego Vicuña, La Zone Économique Exclusive: Régime et
Nature Juridique dans le Droit International, in 199 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9–79 (1986) (discussing interpretations of
the EEZ in light of the 1982 UN Convention on The Law of the Sea); Moira L.
McConnell, Observations on the Law Applicable on the Continental Shelf and in the
Exclusive Economic Zone: A Comparative View, 25 OCEAN Y.B. 221 (2011) (discussing
varying approaches to the EEZ).
60 See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 56, at 84; Gemma Andreone &
Giuseppe Cataldi, Sui Generis Zones, in THE IMLI MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME LAW: THE LAW OF THE SEA 217–238 (David Joseph Attard, Malgosia
Fitzmaurice & Norman A. Martínez Gutiérrez eds., 2014) (discussing aspects of sui
generis zones in international doctrine and practice); FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUÑA,
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: REGIME AND LEGAL NATURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 44 (1989) (explaining that the EEZ is considered sui generis); KWIATKOWSKA,
supra note 56, at 5.
61 See McConnell, supra note 59, at 225; WINSTON C. EXTAVOUR, A STUDY OF
THE EVOLUTION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA (1979). The territorial waters are a belt of coastal waters extending at most 12
nautical miles (22.2 km) from the baseline of a coastal state. The territorial sea is
considered as territory of the coastal state. See Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205;
UNCLOS, supra note 58, arts. 2–3. Under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,
the water column beyond territorial waters is considered as part of the high seas.
See Convention on the High Seas art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
82.
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Proclamations, in particular the Proclamation on Coastal Fisheries
in Certain Areas of the High Seas, that argued the need to set up
conservation zones, under the control of the United States, in those
areas of the high seas contiguous to the coast of the U.S., where
fishing activities had been, or could be, developed and maintained
on a large scale.62 Another Proclamation, namely the Proclamation
in Respect of the Continental Shelf, declared that the resources of
the subsoil and the sea-bed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coast of the U.S. belonged to the
U.S. and had to be subject to its jurisdiction and control.63
Other countries soon followed the U.S. precedent,64 and, thus,
through the years the breadth of their territorial sea and the
maritime areas in which states claimed exclusive jurisdiction on
fishing and exploitation of living resources were expanded up to
200 miles. It is against this background that the negotiations on the
EEZ started in 1972 and led to the adoption of Part V of the Law of
the Sea Convention in 1982.
3.2. Core elements of the EEZ
Articles 55 to 75 of Part V of the Law of the Sea Convention
outline the characteristics of the EEZ. Accordingly, the EEZ is as a
claimable maritime zone that extends up to “200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.”65 Over 130 states have claimed an EEZ, and many
62 See Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,304 (Sept. 18, 1945) (“Policy of
the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High
Seas”). For commentary on the Proclamation, see DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 333–38 (1965) (discussing diverging
interpretations of the Proclamation); and Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, La Remise en
Cause du Droit de la Mer, in COLLOQUE DE MONTPELLIER DE LA SCOIETE FRANÇAISE
POUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 34–35 (1973).
63 See Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945) (“Policy of
the United States with respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed
of the Continental Shelf”).
64 See ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CLAIMS: AN ANALYSIS AND
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS (1986); JOSÉ A. DE YTURRIAGA, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF
FISHERIES: FROM UNCLOS 1982 TO THE PRESENTIAL SEA 5–10 (1997) (discussing the
adaptation of the United States’ interpretation of the Proclamation).
65 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 57.
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have passed legislation applicable to them.66 Importantly, the EEZ
does not belong to the coastal state that has claimed it, even though
such a state enjoys extensive rights to use and manage it.
Part V distinguishes between: a) coastal states; b) other states.67
Coastal states enjoy two types of rights: 1) sovereign rights; 2)
jurisdictional rights. Sovereign rights apply to both living and
non-living resources. First, coastal states have the right to explore,
exploit, conserve, and manage those resources located in the water
column, seabed and subsoil of their EEZ.68 This means that coastal
states are conferred nearly exclusive sovereign rights to undertake
and regulate69 fishing in their EEZ.70 Coastal states are also given
the power to set allowable catches, the duty to preserve fisheries
and achieve their optimal utilization71 as well as the right to
enforce their laws and regulations.72
In principle, a coastal state shall, through agreements, enable
other states to have access to the surplus of its allowable catch; in
doing so, it shall give special consideration to landlocked,
geographically disadvantaged, and least developed states.73 In
practice, this provision has remained largely unattended as, except
for few marginal cases, no such agreements have been concluded.74
66
In principle, states are free to claim an EEZ of lesser breadth than 200
nautical miles and to assert less than the full arrays of rights granted by the EEZ
regime.
67
For an analysis of the rights given to coastal states and other states in the
EEZ, see Andreone, supra note 56, at 165–180; and Robert Beckham & Tara
Davenport, The EEZ Regime: Reflections After Thirty Years, in SECURING THE OCEAN
FOR THE NEXT GENERATION: PAPERS FROM THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE–KOREA
INSTITUTE OF OCEAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE (Harry N. Scheiber &
Moon Sang Kwon eds., 2012), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/BeckmanDavenport-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/22AF-K3NJ] (analyzing the rights given to
coastal states and other states in the EEZ).
68 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 56.
69 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 62 (enumerating a list of areas in relation
to which laws and regulation can be promulgated).
70
On the distribution of fishing rights, see Tore Henriksen & Alf Hakon
Hoel, Determining Allocation: From Paper to Practice in the Distribution of Fishing
Rights Between Countries, 42 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 66 (2011).
71 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, arts. 61–62, 64, 68.
72 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 73.
73 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, arts. 62, 69–70.
74 See Andreone, supra note 56, at 165–66; Ivan Shearer, Ocean Management
Challenges for the Law of the Sea in the First Decade of the 21st Century, in OCEAN
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It is also true that other states have limited capability to enforce it
because the coastal state decisions determining the allowable catch,
the extent of its harvesting ability and the allocation of surpluses
fall outside of the compulsory dispute settlement system set out in
Part XV of the Convention.75
As far as non-living resources are concerned, such as
hydrocarbons and minerals, coastal states benefit from unrestricted
rights of exploration and exploitation, without any specific
obligation of conservation or judicious use.76 These rights are
exclusive because coastal states have no requirement to share
access to those resources.
Under Article 56 of the Law of the Sea Convention, coastal
states are also conferred three kinds of jurisdictional rights
concerning: a) the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations, and structures; b) marine scientific research; c) the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. The first
right is particularly relevant for our Article as it entails the coastal
state’s exclusive jurisdiction to construct and operate artificial
islands, installations, and structures for economic purposes.77 Due
notice shall be given when constructing an artificial island or
installations and the coastal state may, where necessary, establish
safety zones around them.78 Furthermore, in relation to such
islands and installations, coastal states have exclusive jurisdiction
to enact custom, fiscal, health, safety, and immigration laws and
regulations.79
Pursuant to Article 58 of the Law of the Sea Convention, other
states enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight, two rights

MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND RESPONSES 10
(Alex G. Oude Elferink & Donald R. Rothwell eds., 2004).
75 See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 56, at 88. On the dispute settlement
mechanism of the Law of the Sea Convention, see Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement
and the Law of the Sea: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 37 (1997).
76
On the management and utilization of non–living resources, see David M.
Ong, Towards an International Law for Conservation of Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources
Within the Continental Shelf, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 93
(David Freestone, Richard Barnes & David M. Ong eds., 2006).
77 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 60.
78 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 60(3)–(4).
79 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 60(2).
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typical of the high seas.80 However, these rights are less extensive
than those exercisable on the high seas.81 Indeed, within the EEZ
other states shall pay due regard to the rights of the coastal state
and shall comply with the laws and regulations that such a state
has adopted pursuant to the Convention.82 Furthermore, a coastal
state can take measures to ensure compliance by foreign vessels of
such laws.
3.3. The EEZ as a model for the utilization of the near space?
Notwithstanding the differences between the EEZ and the near
space, for instance the fact that the former deals with the
management and utilization of living and non-living resources,
while the latter does not contain resources per se, it is undeniable
that there are similarities between the two. First, the near space
and the sea adjacent to the territorial sea, as regulated prior to the
entry into force of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, share two
characteristics: a) they arguably lay beyond national boundaries;
and b) they lack an internationally recognized legal status.
Secondly, activities in both areas face technological and economic
challenges. Long-term and sustainable operations require constant
technological advancements. This element complicates business
plans and renders the profitability of an envisioned activity
questionable. Third, the use of the near space and the EEZ creates
safety and security concerns, particularly when foreign entities are
involved. Thus, it is of utmost importance to set up a system to
manage operations so as to preserve national security interests and
ensure the prevention of interference with pre-existing activities.
Fourth, due to their peculiar physical characteristics, both
environments naturally prefer the internationalization of their
activities and services. Indeed, due to the fact that several
countries may lack the ability to undertake operation on their own,

80 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, arts. 58(1), 87 (explaining that generally all
states in the Exclusive Economic Zone are able to use the high seas for several
purposes). See generally UNCLOS, supra note 58, pt. VII (“High Seas”).
81
ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 56, at 93.
82
UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 58(3).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/1

2019]

The Exclusive Utilization Space

561

these countries may decide to open up the market to foreign
entities.
Thus, taking into account that states have successfully
managed to agree on rules regulating the utilization of the EEZ, it
seems plausible to consider those rules as valuable precedent for
formulating a framework to manage the utilization of the near
space. Accordingly, the following elements of the EEZ regime are
of particular significance: a) the use of the EEZ area for exclusively
economic purposes; b) the promotion of the optimal use of
resources; c) the sovereign right of the coastal state to manage and
use its EEZ on a priority basis combined with the limited rights of
other countries to participate in activities therein; d) the right of the
coastal state to pass and enforce laws relating to activities
occurring within its EEZ; and e) the preservation of safety, security,
and order within an EEZ. These elements constitute the core of the
Exclusive Utilization Space (EUS) proposal.
4. THE EXCLUSIVE UTILIZATION SPACE
4.1. Why the exclusive utilization space?
As described in the previous Sections, companies across the
world are developing several vehicles capable of providing various
services from the near space. These vehicles are meant to be
deployed both in the near space above their national territories as
well as above the territory of foreign countries.
Importantly, while the technology to carry out near space
operations is making important leaps forward, the same cannot be
said of the legal framework intended to regulate them, which
remains uncertain. The root of the problem is that no international
treaty clearly defines and regulates the near space and its legal
status.
As a matter of fact, several key questions remain
unanswered, for example: What are the conditions to access and
operate in the near space? What kind of services may be provided
therein? How long may a foreign platform be placed over a
foreign territory? What kinds of measures may an underlying state
take to preserve its national security interests?
This uncertainty generates an unpredictable legal framework
that negatively affects near space plans and discourages investors.
Its detrimental impact is particularly noticeable in relation to
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international activities. Indeed, the placement of vehicles in the
near space above foreign territories raises significantly higher
safety and security concerns if compared with the placement of the
same vehicles above national territory. These concerns may
eventually result in barriers to entering and conducting operations
in a foreign near space.
Overall, the present situation not only seems to discourage
innovation, but it also does not create conditions that favor wide
accessibility of services or the profitability of the planned activities.
In an attempt to improve this state of being, one shall consider all
available options. The first option would be to leave the matter
entirely in states’ hands without undertaking any international
effort to ameliorate the uncertain status quo of the near space.
Accordingly, each state would be entitled to independently
regulate the use of the near space above its territory, including the
activities undertaken by foreign entities, without setting up any
internationally agreed rule. While it is reasonable to envision that
certain uses of the near space would be regulated domestically, this
approach runs the risk of resulting in: a) a fragmented legal
framework governing near space activities; b) different conditions
applicable to the same activity in different countries; c) market
access restrictions; d) a somewhat unpredictable regulatory
environment; e) inconsistent safety and security requirements
applicable in different jurisdictions; and f) barriers to access near
space services. From a long-term perspective, this situation
discourages investors and harms both domestic and international
entities. Indeed, for countries that do not possess near space
technology, the presence of foreign near space vehicles above their
territory might be the only way to benefit from near space services.
An alternative option would be to deal with the legal regime of
the near space at international level. Ideally, this would result in
the attribution of a new legal status for the near space: creating the
Exclusive Utilization Space (EUS) and setting up basic rules
governing activities therein. Under this proposal, the near space
would not be part of the national airspace, and it would be, at least
in principle, accessible to domestic and foreign entities. However,
the state above which territory an EUS is placed would enjoy
priority rights of utilization and the right to manage
safety/security matters therein. The EUS idea is inspired by the
precedent of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). As explained in
Section 3.2, the EEZ is an area of the sea adjacent to territorial
waters that does not belong to the coastal state that declares it but
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where such a state exercises sovereign rights of utilization and
management. Third-party countries benefit from several rights in
another country’s EEZ, including the rights of overflight and access
to the surplus of resources. Similarly, under the concept of the
EUS, the choice to establish an EUS would be of the underlying
state. If such a state decides to do so—while not being able to
extend its sovereignty therein—it would enjoy special rights to
administer, supervise, and manage the area, as well as the right to
use it on a priority basis. However, upon meeting certain
conditions, foreign parties would be entitled to access and carry
out activities in the near space.
Notably, other scholars have recommended to confer a new
status to the near space. For instance, a scholar proposed to view
the area extending from 21 to 160 km as the “protozone” to better
regulate safety and security matters therein.83 Another proposal
suggested to apply the legal regime of the high seas to the near
space so as to enable innocent passage by all.84 The differences
between these proposals and the EUS are that: 1) the EUS focuses
on the economic aspects of the utilization of the near space; 2) it
uses the EEZ as a precedent; and 3) it attempts to find a balance
between the interests of the underlying state and foreign entities as
far as the use of a certain near space is concerned. It is the opinion
of the present authors that endorsing the EUS idea would
contribute to: a) enabling the broadest utilization of the near space;
b) clarifying the rights and duties of the actors involved in its use;
c) favoring its predictable and orderly management; d) stimulating
industry growth; and e) favoring accessibility to near space
services.
4.2. Main features of the Exclusive Utilization Space
This Section introduces the main elements of the Exclusive
Utilization Space proposal. A much more detailed description is
given in the next Section.
See Pelton, supra note 21, at 3.
See DEMPSEY & MANOLI, supra note 13, at 44 (discussing the prospect of
treating the near space as an intermediate region akin to the region between
terrirorial seas and high seas under UNCLOS).
83
84
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The main principles of the EUS proposal are the following:
1. An Exclusive Utilization Space should be set up at an
altitude between 18 to 100 km (59,005 to 328,083 feet) above
sea level.
2. An Exclusive Utilization Space should be established for
economic motives.
3. An Exclusive Utilization Space should be established by the
underlying state.
4. An Exclusive Utilization Space should not belong to the
territory of the state above which it is established.
5. The rights of the underlying state over its national airspace
shall not be undermined by the establishment of the
Exclusive Utilization Space.
6. The underlying state retains priority rights to use and
manage the Exclusive Utilization Space established above
its territory.
7. The underlying state can enforce safety and security
matters within the Exclusive Utilization Space established
above its territory.
8. The underlying state and the operator should agree on the
conditions for deployment and operation of high-altitude
platforms within an Exclusive Utilization Space prior to the
commencement of operation.
9. The state above which territory an Exclusive Utilization
Space is established has the right to deny the deployment of
foreign high-altitude platforms based on threats to its
national security and safety interests.
10. Third-party countries/foreign operators should be entitled
to deploy their high-altitude platforms in a foreign
Exclusive Utilization Space subject to prior notification and
approval by the underlying state.
11. Third-party countries/foreign operators are entitled to
overfly a foreign Exclusive Utilization Space upon prior
notification.
12. A license is required to provide services from an Exclusive
Utilization Space established above a foreign territory.
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4.3. Describing the Exclusive Utilization Space proposal
4.3.1. An Exclusive Utilization Space should be set up at an altitude
between 18 to 100 km (59,005 to 328,083 feet) above sea level
An Exclusive Utilization Space should be established at around
the altitude between 18 to 100 km (59,005 to 328,083 feet) above sea
level. This spatial delimitation derives from the fact that the area
represents an intermediate zone between the airspace and outer
space. On one side, commercial passenger aircrafts fly well below
the 18 km mark (59,005 feet); also, air navigation services cannot be
adequately provided beyond that point. On the other side, the 100
km (328,083 feet) level separates the airspace from outer space
because above that altitude aerodynamic operations are no longer
possible and space activities officially begin (even though satellites
must be placed at a minimum altitude of 160 km or 524,934 feet).
Although the area between the altitude of 18 to 100 km has
remained largely un-utilized, several operators have ambitious
plans to deploy their high-altitude platforms in that region. Hence,
it seems reasonable to reserve that area for the establishment of
Exclusive Utilization Spaces.
4.3.2. An Exclusive Utilization Space should be established for
economic motives
The Exclusive Utilization Space proposal is intended to favor
the use of the near space by domestic and foreign entities. Until
now, legal uncertainty, technological barriers, and limited
economic incentives have slowed down progress in the near space.
The goal of the EUS idea is to invert this trend by enabling legal
certainty and favorable conditions for business plans. Importantly,
the focus of the proposal is to enable the economic use of the near
space: a use aimed at providing commercial (paying) services to
customers. Other kinds of activities, such as scientific and military
uses, are not included in the proposal.
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4.3.3. An Exclusive Utilization Space should be established by the
underlying State
The underlying state shall have the sole authority to establish
an Exclusive Utilization Space above its territory. This principle,
which is of crucial relevance in the context of the EUS proposal, is
the result of two considerations: 1) the need to preserve the
national interests of the underlying state; 2) the sovereign and
equal rights of states under international law. First, even if we
assume that the national airspace only extends up to an altitude of
20 km, it goes without doubt that the presence of vehicles at
altitudes beyond that level, especially when operated by foreign
entities, poses potential risks to the fundamental rights of the
underlying state. Therefore, it seems intuitive to grant to that state
the exclusive right to enable operations in the near space above its
territory through the setting up of an EUS. Second, two of the
fundamental rights of states under international law are
sovereignty85 and equality.86 Hence, no state can be forced to act in
85
”Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence” and
“independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein,
to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.” Island of Palmas (U.S.
v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). On the concept of sovereignty, see
generally Sergio M. Carbone & Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe, States, Fundamental
Rights and Duties, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2009), Oxford Public International Law MPEPIL (discussing the ideas and
philosophies behind basic concepts of sovereignty); Janice E. Thomson, State
Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical
Research, 39 INT’L STUD. Q. 213 (1995) (reviewing current research and discussing
issues with empirical research on sovereignty); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 71–97 (2d ed. 2005).
86
According to the right to equality (or equal treatment), all states occupy
the same position within the international community, have the same legal
capacity, and bear equal rights and duties regardless of their size or power. See
generally G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) (declaring equality of sovereigns
in the international community); Charter of the Organization of African Unity art.
3, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (asserting the equality of all member sovereigns);
Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3
(declaring the AU’s accord with sovereign equality). On the concept of equality,
see James Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, 48 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 93 (1977) (discussing equality of sovereigns in the international legal
community).
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a manner contrary to its sovereign interests or that puts it in a
disadvantageous position with respect to other countries,
especially when security considerations are at stake.
Consequently, no state can be obliged to set up an EUS above its
territory if it does not choose to do so.
4.3.4. The Exclusive Utilization Space should not belong to the
territory of the State above which it is established
Similarly to the Exclusive Economic Zone, which does not
belong to the coastal state that has established it, the Exclusive
Utilization Space should not be included in the territory of the
underlying state that has declared it. Thus, although the portion of
the airspace going from ground level up to an altitude of 18 km
could be viewed as part of the national airspace of the underlying
state, the same could not be said of the area ranging from 18 to 100
km (59,005 to 328,083 feet), namely the EUS, which should not be
considered part of a state’s territory, even though the underlying
state should enjoy extensive rights to manage and use it. This
proposal is intended to mitigate the obstacles posed by sovereignty
to the use of the near space, especially the barriers that foreign
entities may face to access and provide services from a near space
located above a foreign territory. Indeed, even though these
entities would have to comply with the operational conditions
imposed by the underlying state, the absence of sovereigntyrelated considerations is more likely to favor a balance between the
preservation of national interests and the (foreign) utilization of the
near space.
4.3.5. The establishment of an Exclusive Utilization Space shall not
undermine the rights of the underlying State over its national
airspace
The Exclusive Utilization Space’s proposal is not meant in any
way to harm the sovereignty and the rights of a state within its
national airspace. Indeed, even if a state decides to set up an
Exclusive Utilization Space above its territory, its authority to
legislate over, administer, and control the activities taking place in
the airspace up to an altitude of 18 km would remain untouched.
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The underlying State will always have the ultimate power to
suspend, modify, or terminate a near space operation that
endangers its safety and security interests.
4.3.6. The underlying State retains priory rights to use and
administer the Exclusive Utilization Space established above its
territory
The underlying state should enjoy sovereign rights to use and
manage the Exclusive Utilization Space established above its
territory on a priority basis; this means that, even if a state decides
to set up an Exclusive Utilization Space, its ability to utilize that
Space before any other subject should not be compromised. This
right can be either exclusive or inclusive. In the first case, the
underlying state does not allow other entities, either domestic or
foreign, to operate therein, a decision which may derive from their
inability to comply with safety and security requirements. In the
second case, the underlying state allows other states or entities to
operate therein. However, even in this situation, it should retain
the right to supervise their activities and to ensure compliance with
the contractual conditions agreed prior to the commencement of
operations.
4.3.7. The underlying State is entitled to regulate and enforce safety
and security matters within the Exclusive Utilization Space
established above its territory
The placement and operation of high-altitude vehicles,
particularly those controlled by foreign entities, undoubtedly raises
security and safety concerns for the underlying state.
From a security perspective, the mostly stationary nature of
these vehicles is troublesome because, in principle, they might be
used to spy on sensitive facilities and areas such as governmental
buildings and military bases. High-altitude vehicles might also be
used to coordinate and support operations detrimental to the
sovereignty of the underlying state via communication links.
There are also privacy issues to consider.
From a safety perspective, the main concern is to ensure that
near space activities do not interfere with pre-existing operations
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and services. First, the deployment and recovery of high-altitude
vehicles shall be organized in a manner that poses no risk to air
traffic or to the eventual launch of a space object. Second, as highaltitude vehicles are mostly meant to provide communication and
internet services, it is crucial to make sure that these vehicles do
not cause any harmful interference to pre-existing services.
Based on these considerations, the underlying state shall have
the right to set the safety and security requirements that an
operator shall be able to comply with in order to be allowed to
operate in the near space above its territory and to enforce them
upon domestic and foreign entities. Failure to comply with such
requirements might result in temporary suspension, revision or
termination of the activities.
4.3.8. The underlying State and the operator should agree on the
conditions for deployment and operation of high-altitude
platforms prior to the commencement of operations
Any foreign or domestic entity willing to provide services from
an Exclusive Utilization Space shall agree with the underlying state
about the conditions to operate therein before the activities begin.
The underlying state must evaluate the potential negative impact
of the proposed operations on national security and safety interests
as well as on the rights of its citizens. To do so, the operator
should submit a plan detailing the nature, duration and purpose of
its planned activities. Only after a thorough review of the plan and
an assessment of the technical and financial soundness of the
applicant might the underlying state authorize commencement of
the operations. Such an authorization might take the form of a
license. However, it is entirely up to each state to determine how
to structure the authorization process. The bottom line is that
high-altitude vehicles, especially when owned by foreign entities,
cannot be deployed in an Exclusive Utilization Space without
obtaining prior authorization from the underlying state.
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4.3.9. The state above which territory an Exclusive Utilization Space
is established has the right to deny the deployment of foreign
high-altitude platforms based on threat to its national security
and safety interests.
When near space services are undertaken by foreign entities,
preserving national security interests, avoiding harmful
interferences and other safety hazards is of paramount importance.
Indeed, safety and security concerns may lead the underlying state
to reject the foreign entity’s plan to provide services from the near
space located above its territory. In the most likely scenario, the
underlying state might make this decision after deeming the
operator incapable of satisfying safety and security requirements.
The underlying state should, however, notify the entity of the
reasons for the denial and give the opportunity to address them.
4.3.10. Third-party countries/foreign operators should be entitled to
deploy their high-altitude platforms in a foreign Exclusive
Utilization Space subject to prior notification and approval by
the underlying state.
When a foreign entity intends to provide services from an
Exclusive Utilization Space located above another country’s
territory, it shall notify its intention to do so to the underlying state
and submit an operational plan. A violation of this rule, especially
the unannounced deployment of high-altitude vehicles, would
constitute a breach of the underlying state’s rights and a threat to
its national security interests. In this event, the underlying state
would have the right to take all necessary measures to react to this
behavior. However, if the foreign entity/state has acted according
to the above principles, it should be entitled to deploy its vehicles
and provide the proposed services, unless provable and serious
motives exist, such as financial issues or safety and security
concerns. The advantageous position attributed to foreign entities
is justifiable under the following grounds: First, the goal of
Exclusive Utilization Space’s proposal is to promote the broadest
use of the near space, particularly in countries which lack the
capability to do so. Consequently, the advantage conferred to
(foreign) entities is meant to encourage them to enter the near
space business and to offer services to any interested customer
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worldwide. Second, it is likely that prior to the commencement of
operations, the underlying state and the foreign entity have
discussed the possibility of the latter providing near space services
to the former. Based on these discussions, the foreign entity might
have invested technological and financial resources to develop the
necessary capabilities to undertake those services. Thus, once the
capabilities are mature, if the review of the operational plan is
positive, there seems to be little reason for that entity to be refused
the right to deploy its vehicles in a foreign Exclusive Utilization
Space. Importantly, even when the plan is approved, the foreign
entity should always comply with the operational conditions and
licensing requirements set out by the underlying state. Thirdly, the
establishment of an Exclusive Utilization Space is a clear indication
of the underlying state’s willingness to promote the use of the near
space above its territory and to attract all interested entities,
including the foreign ones.
The possibility to deploy high-altitude platforms assumes
particular relevance in relation to projects aimed at building
communication networks across several countries. In this context,
an entity from State A might be willing to place broadband
transceivers in the near space above State B to provide services to
States C and D. The deployment of these kinds of transceivers
raises limited security and safety concerns from the perspective of
State B, the underlying state. Therefore, in these cases, it seems
limiting the ground for that state to oppose these projects is
warranted, especially if the entity has notified the state of its plan
and demonstrated technical reliability.
4.3.11. Third-party countries/foreign operators should enjoy the
right to overfly a foreign Exclusive Utilization Space upon prior
notification.
Despite their mostly stationary nature, some high-altitude
vehicles possess a certain degree of maneuverability. Foreign
entities should then be entitled to transit their high-altitude
vehicles through a foreign Exclusive Utilization Space provided
that the underlying state is notified in advance.
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4.3.12. A license is required to provide services from an EUS
established above a foreign territory
When considering near space activities, two types of licenses
can be envisioned: 1) a license to launch and operate a highaltitude vehicle; and 2) a license to provide near space services.
The first one will be issued by the state in which the entity is
registered which we may label State A. The state responsible to
issue the second license is the one where the services are provided.
If the services are expected to be offered within State A, State A
would be in charge of issuing both licenses. Instead, if the entity
intends to provide services to a third country, for instance State B,
it would be the responsibility of State B to grant a service license.
Obviously, State B would issue such a license if it deems the
proposed activity not detrimental to its national security interests.
The license would then include a series of requirements to prevent
harmful interferences with pre-existing services as well as the
modalities to supervise the licensed operations. Furthermore, the
licensing authority would be entitled to demand an annual fee
from the licensee. This kind of licensing system is not uncommon.
For example, in the context of the licensing of a mega-constellation
of satellites, the Federal Communications Commission has recently
granted OneWeb access to the U.S. communication market.87 Since
OneWeb is a U.K.-based company, the launch of its satellites must
be authorized by the United Kingdom.88 However, in order to
87 See WorldVu Satellites Limited, 32 FCC Rcd. 5366 (2017) (granting a
declaratory ruling regarding the conditions under which WorldVu will be
allowed to enter the U.S. market); see also Press Release, Fed. Comm. Comm’n,
FCC Grants OneWeb U.S. Access for Broadband Satellite Constellation (2017),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-345467A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TR9-XFN2] (announcing the grant of U.S. access to
WorldVu).
88
According to Article VI of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a nongovernmental entity willing to undertake space activities must be authorized and
continuously supervised by an appropriate state. See Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VI, Apr. 22, 1968, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (establishing the criteria for permitting NGOs to undertake
space activities); see also F.G. von der Dunk, The Origins of Authorization: Article VI
of the Outer Space Treaty and International Space Law, in 6 STUDIES IN SPACE LAW 3–28
(F.G. von der Dunk ed., 2011) (discussing Article VI).
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provide broadband services using satellite technologies in the
United States, it requires a license to do so by the competent U.S.
authority.
5. CONCLUSION
Near space activities are the future of aerospace operations.
Considering that these activities are envisioned to be profitable,
several non-governmental entities have entered the near space
business with the goal of offering services on a domestic and
international basis.
Despite these positive factors, the uncertain legal status of the
near space still slows down the realization of near space activities
on a large scale. This uncertainty particularly harms international
activities involving vehicles placed above a foreign near space.
This situation may not only lead some entities to renounce their
near space ambitions, but may also affect customers, who could be
deprived of otherwise unavailable services.
In order to overcome these obstacles and to enable accessibility
of services, this Article has suggested a new classification of the
near space as the Exclusive Utilization Space. At its core, the EUS
proposal attempts to balance the rights of the state above which
territory an EUS is established—the underlying state—and the
interests of the entities willing to provide near space services. On
one hand, while the EUS should not belong to the underlying state,
such a state should retain sovereign and priory rights of utilization
and management therein. On the other hand, domestic and
especially foreign entities, upon meeting safety and security
requirements, should have the opportunity to deploy their vehicles
and to provide services. The EUS proposal is not meant to
undermine the legal position of the underlying state, which has the
exclusive authority to set up an EUS above its land as well as the
right to lay down the operation conditions to be complied with by
operators.
The Authors of this Article are aware of the controversial and
still embryonic nature of the EUS proposal. Furthermore, this
proposal might need some refinement and a greater level of
specificity before being applied in practice. Nonetheless, the
ultimate goal of this Article is to draw attention to the legal issues
surrounding the near space and to encourage the international
community to engage in discussions about developing a regulatory
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framework to govern activities therein. In this respect, a possible
forum for this discussion could be the ICAO, which has already
showed interest in addressing and possibly regulating aerospace
matters, as demonstrated by the recent establishment of the ICAO
Space Learning Group.
We conclude with the hope that the near space era will bring
benefits to the broadest number of users, especially civilians, and
will contribute to broader access to services and better conditions
across the globe.
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